Operation Clean Heart has ended amid much controversy.  It is an appropriate time for a profit and loss analysis of the operation for various stakeholders.

Ordinary people are clearly on the profit side.  They enjoyed a rare taste of security to some extent.  Many landowners in Dhaka and other cities/town tried to finish key construction activities before the army operation ends.

It is very difficult to assess the profit/loss of the ruling BNP.  The image of the party, especially of its leader Khaleda Zia, has become brighter as she has become able to fulfill her election commitment of improving law and order situation (although may be for a limited period of time).  Some people are even saying that she did what Mujib could not do.  However her image brightening has been done at a cost of her party.  Most of the criminals arrested, tortured and killed by the operation are from BNP.  The damage of the party goes to such an extent that some ministers commented that ‘BNP will need more than a decade to recover it’.  The operation resulted such a vacuum at the grass root level that top leaders are very worried about the outcome of the forthcoming local government elections.  However, there is optimism among some people who thinks that the operation will drive away most of the criminals from BNP and let Tarek Zia build a purer party.

Although the opposition Awami League is raising hue and cry against the army operation, its local ‘not-so-criminal’ leaders who were driven away by BNP activists after 2001 election has been able to come back to home because of the army operation.  It is not unlikely that Awami League will win an unprecedented victory in the local government election.  However, Sheikh Hasina’s stand against the army operation and her anti-Bangladesh activities abroad may blacken the image of the party.

Jamaat’s profit account is probably the heaviest.  ‘Operation Clean Heart’ has helped the Jamaatis to establish their claim that they are not criminal or ‘listed terrorists’ like the leaders/activists of the major two parties.  They will get and utilize the advantage of the leadership vacuum created by arresting local leaders of BNP and Awami League.  In places where they were ‘unofficially banned’, like Dhaka University Campus, they will try to start their open activities.  The most important profit for Jamaat is the sympathy of the army Jawans is has obtained during the operation.  They have come to know the difference between Jamaat leader/activists and that of other political parties.  It will remove the possibility of army crackdown in case Jamaat gets full power, as happened in Algeria or Turkey.  However, there is a possibility of BNP-AL joint assault on Jamaat as soon as the operation ends.  There are newspaper reports that Chhatra Dal activists have already started their ‘Operation Clean Jamaat’ in several educational institutes in Dhaka.  It will jeopardize the four party coalition and may result in a repetition of 92-96 events.

India, although not a direct partner of the business, experienced a significant loss due to the operation.  Informal trade at India-Bangladesh border has reduced significantly during the previous two months.  Most of the ‘top-terrors’ are now staying jobless in India.  An atmosphere in Bangladesh conducive to development of business and industries is a threat to Indian business interest here.

The success of the drive was undermined by the death of around 40 persons in army custody.  Although none of them were ‘gobechara’ ordinary citizens like us, you cannot kill someone without a proper and fair trail.  Many of them might not have performed crime worth death penalty.  There were widespread expectations that these incidents would be brought to justice.

By declaring indemnity, the government has closed the door of justice for these incidents and in turn has given a mandate to any future such drive to do whatever the army likes.  In such future drives, members of the action team will find much more personal agenda to carryout.  On the other hand, if the government allowed bringing the armed forces member to trail, there was a possibility that the army would not work efficiently in such future operations.  It might even lead to army unrest.  They would not take it easy to see their fellow members receiving death penalties for doing what the government asked them to do.

In all debates relating Operation Clean Heart a fundamental issue has been ignored.  Very few people asked why we needed such unusual operations in the first place?  Most of the terrorists arrested and killed are from the ruling party.  The rest are from the immediate past ruling party.  They have been growing weeds in our farms.  Now they are trying to clean it with a potential risk of harming our own crops.

Can we do anything to clean our political parties in order to avoid such future heart cleaning operations?